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Intellectual Property and Health in
Developing Countries
Jean Tirole
THE DEBATE
Few issues are as controversial as the impact of intellectual property on health
in developing countries. Activists and poor countries’ governments have, for
example, long claimed that patents on antiretroviral (ARV) drugs make AIDS
treatments unaffordable in Africa and other low-income areas. Pharmaceu-
tical companies have argued, to the contrary, that the problem is elsewhere,
and that rich countries’ governments should take the responsibility if vaccines
and drugs are to be brought to the poor. Rich countries’ governments, un-
surprisingly, have not been keen on committing funds to promote health in
Third World countries.
Finger-pointing with regard to the AIDS problem is but one of the many
symptoms of the overall tension over intellectual property rights (IPRs) be-
tween high-income countries, on the one hand, and middle- and low-income
ones, on the other hand. More generally, IPRs are the focus of intense interest
to developing countries, which express particular concerns for health, plant
breeders’ rights, traditional knowledge, and education and research.
The WTO TRIPS agreement1 requires that all WTO members put in place
some minimal protection of IPRs by 2006, with a more recent option for
the least developed countries to extend the transition period to 2016. Of
particular relevance for this chapter, about fifty developing members of WTO
that did not provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products will now
have to do so, although they will still be able to impose price controls on
medicines and in “emergencies” (a concept left broadly undefined at the
WTO consultation in Doha in 2001) resort to compulsory licensing.
This essay focuses on the impact of IPRs on low- and middle-income
Forthcoming in  A. Banerjee, R. Benabou and  D. Mookherjee, eds., Understanding Poverty. Oxford University Press. 
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countries’ health care. Many fine contributions have been made to this topic,
and the essay aims only at taking stock of where we stand and at listing what
we need to give further thought to.
It is widely recognized that there are two different reasons why poor coun-
tries may not have access to needed vaccines and drugs.
In the case of global diseases, such as diabetes or cancer, patents may
hinder the diffusion of pharmaceuticals. IP owners are often reluctant to
offer drastically lower prices to poor countries because they fear that rich
countries will balk at tiered pricing (witness the shameful statements of some
American politicians to the effect that drugs invented in America should not
be available at much lower prices elsewhere,2 and the more insidious use of
reference price controls, a benchmarking procedure that ties prices in a rich
country to prices abroad, and therefore discourages the use of discounts in
poorer countries). Pharmaceutical companies may further be concerned that
low prices in poor countries will lead to massive parallel imports in rich
countries, their natural income base3 (although this concern has been partly
alleviated by the August 30, 2003, WTO decision on the implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration).
But even if pharmaceutical companies ignore these linkages and, as busi-
ness judgment would command, practice price discrimination in favor of
poor countries, much of the population of these poor countries may still not
have access to the drugs for several reasons. First, profit maximization may
lead pharmaceutical companies to target the elite and the middle class, not
the insolvent poor. Second, and as the rich countries’ protagonists (phar-
maceutical companies, governments, activists) all agree, patents are at most
part of the issue, for two reasons.
First, other costs may be added on top of royalties. Royalties are only part
of the financial cost of medicines; manufacturing and monitoring costs may
also be significant.
While most medicines’ marginal cost is very small, it may be nonnegligible
for some. In particular, the lowest cost of ARV triple therapies treatment is
often estimated at $200–$300 per person per year by producers of cheap
copies in India and elsewhere, and used to be much higher. This is still an
enormous amount of money for low-income countries with average per cap-
ita health expenditures of $23.4
The monitoring of treatments by medical personnel can be extremely
important for treatments such as those for ARV, for which a proper moni-
toring brings the cost to about $1,100 per capita per year.5 The medical
infrastructure is also crucial for prescriptions; estimates for India indicate a
50% rate of unnecessary or contraindicated drug prescriptions.6 More gen-
erally, the health infrastructure is often so underdeveloped that diseases
whose treatment or vaccine is off patent and cheap to produce are still wide-
spread.7 A related problem is that treatments are not always available in poor
countries in which IP owners do not bother to take patents. A widely cited
study by Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001) looks at fifteen ARV drugs in
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fifty-three countries. Of the resulting 795 potential patents, only 172 (21.6%)
actually exist. While the actual picture is more complex8 (patent owners tend
to patent in relatively high-income and populous or highly infected countries,
such as South Africa; patents may not reflect IP importance; etc.), this num-
ber makes it clear that patents cannot be the end of the story.
Still another reason why royalties are only part of the cost is that some
countries impose tariffs and taxes on pharmaceuticals.
Second, populist sentiments may deter politicians in rich and poor coun-
tries, as well as multilateral organizations, from trying to find solutions. I
have already mentioned the equivocal stance of rich countries, which argue
in favor of low prices for poor countries while being unwilling to foot the
bill and opposing tiered pricing. Poor countries’ leaders sometimes do not
help either, as when they express nationalistic preference for locally produced
cures, or when President Mbeki of SouthAfrica expresses doubts about the
link between HIV and AIDS. Populist sentiments also deter multilateral or-
ganizations such as the WHO from recommending vaccines that have not
been approved in developed countries because of their side effects; such side
effects may be relevant in countries in which the vaccine is of little use, but,
for lack of anything better, second-order in others in which the disease is
pandemic. Yet health authorities may balk at recommending such vaccines
for fear of a (misguided) political backlash.
The second set of issues relates to neglected or tropical diseases, such as
malaria, tuberculosis, and leishmaniasis, that are of primary concern to de-
veloping countries, or more generally to diseases for which revenues from
rich countries do not suffice to attract R&D funding. The corresponding
vaccines or drugs are not developed because of low profitability due to the
poverty of potential customers (perhaps combined with the fear of compul-
sory licensing). There are several illustrations of the shortage of research in
the area: limited work on malaria and tuberculosis, and virtually none on
sleeping sickness.9 A widely circulated statistic is that since 1975, only 11 of
1,300 newly developed drugs relate to developing countries’ diseases, and five
of them are by-products of veterinary research. The (off-patent) drugs
against sleeping sickness date back to 1917, 1939, and 1949 (a dangerous
arsenic derivative) and also include an inadvertent by-product of cancer re-
search.10 More indirect evidence that there is little R&D on poor countries’
diseases is the observation that there is much less research on vaccines than
on drugs, despite the fact that the former have an important advantage over
the latter in poor countries, in that they are much less dependent on a good
health care delivery system.11
It is of course hard to draw a clear line between global and neglected
diseases. AIDS, for instance, stands in between. While it is a global disease,
most of the research has focused on the strain that is most common in rich
countries. But it is useful to keep in mind this taxonomy, since the solutions
for global and neglected diseases are likely to differ.
As might be expected, the wide consensus around the insufficient access
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of poor countries to vaccines and drugs disappears when it comes to attrib-
uting responsibilities and duties for helping the poor bridge their health gap
with the rich world. Candidate policies include
• Donations and acquiescence to low prices in LDCs by the industry;
• Unilateral actions by poor countries’ authorities, in the form of com-
pulsory licensing;
• Unilateral actions by rich countries’ governments, such as aid to
health programs in poor countries; or, in countries with an inno-
vative pharmaceutical industry, tax credits for R&D on neglected dis-
eases or matching programs when the pharmaceutical industry do-
nates or sells vaccines and drugs to nonprofit or multilateral
organizations dealing with poor countries;12 and research on ne-
glected diseases in national laboratories;
• Multilateral efforts by rich countries, including conferring on the
WHO a role of certification similar to that of the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration;13 pull and push programs aimed at encourag-
ing research on neglected diseases; or the development by the WTO
of a set of precise guidelines for the compulsory licensing of drugs.
TOWARD A GLOBAL SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR HEALTH
Intervention in the marketplace always requires a prior analysis of the source
of failure and an identification of what goals one is trying to pursue.
In the context of health, one must first understand why health and phar-
maceuticals (as opposed to poverty) are such controversial issues. For ex-
ample, no one would think that the poor’s lack of access to Sony’s Trinitron
tube patented system for color TV is a serious issue (as opposed to the poor’s
being poor). So why is health different? Curiously, and for all our intuition
about the matter, the answer is not completely obvious, and requires some
thinking. In the mid-1970s, two economists, Tony Atkinson and Joe Stiglitz,
derived a result that still confounds the advocates of targeted policy inter-
ventions. They showed that under some conditions,14 all redistribution
among economic agents should operate through a redistribution of income.
That is, however redistribution-minded the government is, it should refrain
from subsidizing some goods and taxing others. For example, governments
should not “force” consumers to consume electricity or local telephone serv-
ices (often subsidized services) by offering them low prices. The message and
logic behind this result are straightforward: make the distribution of income
more equal,15 and let the consumers decide what they want to consume. This
result is useful for what it really is: a benchmark that serves as a warning
against unmotivated paternalistic preferences of governments, and for which
departures are vindicated by well-documented failures of the assumptions.
One of the strong assumptions underlying the sufficiency of income taxation
is the perfect verifiability of income; in practice, income tax is evaded in legal
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(perks, loopholes) and illegal ways, which suggests taxing goods and services
mostly demanded by the rich more heavily.
To see why health is different from other goods and services, let us first
take a look at rich countries. There are several reasons why using health-
related policies to redistribute may actually make sense despite the Atkinson
and Stiglitz result (these reasons by and large also apply to education, which
may explain why health and education are the two pillars of social democ-
racy). First, health is an input into the production of income (this will be
particularly so for poor countries). An alternative to income taxation as a
means of redistributing income—and one that is less distortive of labor sup-
ply—is to make sure that access to health services is not too unequal. Second,
decisions relative to health are, in the case of children, made on behalf of
the person, and not by the individual himself/herself; there is thus a concern
that some children are denied access to the treatments that they should re-
ceive. Third, there are, in the case of vaccines, externalities.
Lo and behold, even the more market-oriented economies heavily regulate
health care. Price caps on medicines are widespread (with substantial varia-
tions, though; for example, prices of on-patent drugs in the United States
are about twice the French or Italian level).
To be certain, the real motivation behind these regulations is often un-
related to the normative considerations just discussed; rather, they reflect
two less avowable political economy considerations. First, the pharmaceutical
industry has high fixed costs and low marginal costs, a situation that makes
expropriation of investment through low prices, once the fixed costs have
been sunk, quite tempting. Second, and more specific to the international
context, innovations are global public goods, and thus individual countries
do not benefit from promising “fair prices” even if they can commit to them.
Indeed, each country has a private incentive to free-ride on other countries
and pay as little as possible for these global public goods.16 Price regulation
of patented drugs is a simple way to obtain this free ride.
An interesting case in point is the fall 2001 Cipro saga in the United
States. In the midst of the anthrax scare, Health and Human Services Sec-
retary Tommy Thompson threatened Cipro manufacturer Bayer with com-
pulsory licensing17 and forced it to slash prices (ironically, in the same way
South Africa forced Merck, Bristol-Myers, and others to cut prices on AIDS
treatments, generating a protest from the American government). While
everyone will agree that something would have gone wrong if the anthrax
threat had proved to be widespread and if Bayer had jacked up prices so as
to make Cipro unaffordable to a fraction of the American population, the
U.S. government’s intervention raises questions about the pharmaceutical
industry’s incentive to develop vaccines and drugs for future bioterrorism
attacks. Low-probability events require large rewards to justify R&D expen-
ditures. (To be sure, the problem is not specific to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. Take the power industry, in which prices may, even in the absence
of exercise of market power, jump by a factor of 20 or 100 during peak
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time—a few hours or days during the year. Price caps aimed at limiting
economic rents during these peak hours are widely perceived as a disincentive
to install or maintain peaking production facilities that operate optimally
only a few days a year.)
To sum up:
• There is a legitimate (normative) argument in favor of using the
health care system in order to redistribute. And, given limited budg-
ets, there is also a case for regulating drug prices so as to allow a
more democratic access to drugs, although it must be recognized that
such policies come at the cost of a lower innovation rate.
• While price controls are probably better explained by the unavowable
motives of (a) opportunistically expropriating pharmaceuticals once
R&D has been sunk and (b) free-riding on other countries, the nor-
mative side is still a key ingredient in these positive explanations, to
the extent that it can explain why governments are given much larger
discretion in the realm of pharmaceuticals than for other products
under the TRIPS and other multilateral agreements.
The case for redistribution through health policies is stronger interna-
tionally. Income redistribution is less developed across than within countries.
This of course is due to the selfishness of rich countries, which redistribute
hardly anything to poor countries. Selfishness, to be certain, is only part of
the story. First, the fight against poverty is itself a global public good, and
so even a country with altruistic preferences may still prefer other countries
to provide the global public good. Second, it is by no means easy to ensure
that income transfers reach the right people.18 Third, means-tested aid, like
any other form of assistance, creates moral hazard. Yet it is a safe bet that
even if a multilateral agreement could be reached concerning rich countries’
contributions to world economic development and if solutions to the delivery
problem could be found, rich countries’ generosity would still show its limits.
Historically, a substantial, although not very visible, share of the redistri-
bution from rich to poor countries has operated through free (or low-price)
IP transfers. Technologies developed in rich countries reach poor countries,
after a delay, when they go off-patent. And on-patent technologies have in
the past not been covered by IP protection, a situation that is modified by
the TRIPS agreement, although, as we have noted, countries can still threaten
compulsory licensing in order to obtain very favorable deals from IP owners.
It is perhaps unsurprising that substantial transfers have occurred in-kind
through the IP system while there have been very few in cash. For one thing,
knowledge transfers are much less dependent on the cooperation of rich
countries’ governments. And they don’t confront quite the same delivery
problems as cash transfers. But the fact that IP transfers are an important
source of redistribution to low- and middle-income countries in a world
desperately in need of worldwide redistribution does not imply that existing
transfers are fair or efficient, as we will observe.
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A global social contract for global diseases should differentiate prices so
as to reflect the health-related needs of countries and, for neglected diseases,
design new mechanisms that will boost private incentives to develop vaccines
and drugs. The final two sections of the essay accordingly investigate two
(complementary) policy interventions: compulsory licensing and health-
related aid.
RULE-BASED COMPULSORY LICENSING
This section argues that compulsory licensing should keep playing an im-
portant role for low- and middle-income countries, although definitely not
in its current form. Before we take up the argument, let us step back and
return to some basic economics of compulsory licensing. (Many of the issues
discussed below are also relevant for the discussion of the prize mechanism
studied later in this paper, since the issue of the “right prices” arises there
as well.)
General Considerations about Compulsory Licensing
As is well understood in industrial organization, the problem of encouraging
innovation is akin to that of regulating a natural monopoly. Both setups
involve substantial returns to scale, and thus pricing at marginal cost does
not allow firms to cover their total cost. Somehow, fixed costs have to be
recouped through sizeable “taxes,” “contributions,” or “markups” above
marginal costs.19
A “Ramsey social planner” (as it is called in the economics literature)
must, in order to maximize social welfare:
• Design an overall reward or price level that allows the firm to receive
a fair rate of return on the fixed cost of producing the “facility” or
the patent (price level challenge)
• Allocate the markups on the different uses made of the “facility” or
patent so as to minimize the social deadweight loss (relative prices
challenge).
The economist’s answer to the latter challenge is the well-known Ramsey
rule. Lower markups should be applied to those segments with the highest
elasticities of demand (which often coincide with segments populated with
low-income consumers), so as to minimize the value loss incurred when high
prices deter potential users from consuming. It turns out that this Ramsey
principle is in tune with private incentives, since it is also in the interest of
a private monopoly to tailor prices across segments as a function of what
each market segment can bear; this observation is indeed one of the justifi-
cations for price caps, which decentralize the choice of relative prices to the
regulated firm in network industries such as the telecommunications, elec-
tricity, gas, rail, and postal sectors.20 (A caveat here: the elasticities of demand
reflect not only the consumers’ true demand function and their income, but
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also the availability of substitute products—the so-called bypass opportuni-
ties. Ramsey pricing may be constrained by these bypass options, but ideally
would eliminate them so as to achieve unconstrained Ramsey pricing. More
on this later.)
The price-level challenge poses more complex issues. To provide the firm
with a fair rate of return on investment, the Ramsey social planner must
have an estimate of the investment cost. In regulated industries, regulators’
permanent and specialized staffs collect substantial amounts of data about
the firms’ costs in regulated segments and further try to insulate regulated
segments from cross-subsidization in favor of unregulated ones. In the case
of a patent, the regulator—the authority that orders and monitors the com-
pulsory license—has little knowledge about the actual cost incurred by the
pharmaceutical company in developing the particular medicine.
Another informational obstacle in the case of a compulsory license comes
from the fact that R&D is a very risky activity. A project that costs $100
million and has a 10% chance of success should engender $1 billion in in-
come (ignoring interest and risk premiums) in order for the pharmaceutical
company to be willing to undertake it. A regulator’s attempt at regulating
the rate of return on a medicine must therefore also estimate the ex ante
probability that this medicine will succeed. The “fair income” is highly sen-
sitive to the subjective estimate of this probability (for example, it is multi-
plied by 4 when the probability of success moves from 20% to 5%).
The implications are clear. Even in the simple context envisioned here, a
proper implementation of compulsory licensing is no easy task, even for a
benevolent regulator. It is no surprise, then, that courts routinely commend
“licensing at a fair and reasonable price” when they order compulsory li-
censes but rarely specify what it means. Things get worse if the regulator
behaves opportunistically; in contrast to the case of regulated network in-
dustries, in which the firm can appeal what it perceives to be a taking by
relying on regulatory evidence on cost data, there is no such natural bench-
mark to substantiate the appeal in the case of a patent.
Application to Medicines for Global Diseases
I heartily subscribe to the view that the cost burden of medicines for global
diseases should be shared unequally across countries. Low-income countries
should pay less than medium-income countries, which in turn should pay
less than rich countries. Unfortunately, current practice associated with the
threat of compulsory licensing21 hardly delivers such a Ramsey structure.
Until recently, compulsory licensing was credible only if the country had a
reasonable domestic capacity for competitive production of copies. With
some exceptions (India being the most prominent one), such countries are
rarely low-income countries.22 Sub-Saharan African countries are unlikely to
take advantage of compulsory licensing unless they purchase copies form
third countries, in contravention of international agreements. Another issue
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is that compulsory licensing is a unilateral initiative that rewards countries
with little (to) fear and penalizes (relatively) those who are afraid of reprisals.
A normatively satisfactory pricing system would not reflect the bargaining
positions of the countries (whether they result from bypass opportunities or
other considerations), but rather their needs. The current setting certainly
does not obey this principle.
A more satisfactory and fairer system would probably reflect the following
desiderata:
• Rule-based compulsory licensing rather than unilateral actions by
individual countries,
• Expedient procedures administered by a politically independent
agency (so as to avoid constant political pressure from influential
countries),
• Means-tested conditions,
• Strict prohibition of parallel imports/exports, and
• Some other forms of conditionality.
Let me briefly discuss a few of these desiderata. First, the prohibition of
parallel imports or exports is of the utmost importance. The medicines man-
ufactured for Bangladesh or Botswana should not reach the United States,
France, or Saudi Arabia, for this would destroy the whole edifice. Developing
countries must understand that they have a lot to lose from parallel imports.
This is not to say that the system created by the TRIPS agreement, in which
compulsory licenses are primarily for domestic production, is a good one. It
was motivated partly by the fear that medicines would turn footloose, thereby
undermining the tiered-pricing system; but, as we observed, it did not allow
the vast majority of poor countries to have access to the needed products.
One should therefore create a monitoring body (to which pharmaceutical
companies could be associated, so they would gain some reassurance and
would thereby be co-opted into the scheme) in order to license producers
of copies and control flows of medicines. Thus, Botswana could procure a
medicine from India if it failed to reach a production agreement with the
patent owner for the supplies needed (it is important to conceptually separate
IP ownership and production, even though in practice the patent owner
already has facilities and expertise, and is often a serious candidate supplier).
While the principle of means-tested conditions is straightforward, its ap-
plication is not. Per capita income is certainly a key component, but it is
not the only one. One difficult issue, for example, is the treatment of coun-
tries with high income inequalities (that is, relatively rich countries with a
sizable fraction of destitute inhabitants).
As in the case of other multilateral agreements, the benefits of being part
of the scheme could go together with some forms of conditionality regarding
minimum standards for health information, tariffs and taxes on pharmaceu-
ticals, and so forth.
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Probably the thorniest issue concerns the compensation under a com-
pulsory license. One aspect is its structure: Should this be a lump sum paid
by the country to the pharmaceutical company for basically unlimited access
to the medicine at marginal cost—possibly from producers of copies? Or, as
is most often proposed, a royalty of 3% or 4%23 of the sales price of the
medicine?24
Still another, more market-oriented scheme that could be considered is
the purchase by each country (or an international organization or foundation
on its behalf) of an unlimited licensing right for domestic consumption.
Although this scheme could be transaction-cost-intensive (but see the dis-
cussion below), here is how the mechanism could operate. The pharmaceu-
tical company could be instructed to spin off an entity with the exclusive
right to distribute the product in the country (or group of countries) in
question. The market price for this entity would presumably be the monop-
oly profit to be made in the country. The entity could be taken over through
a tender process by the buyer (again a foundation, such as the Gates Foun-
dation, a multilateral organization, the country itself, or a combination of
the three),25 which could then sell the medicine at a negligible price or donate
it. This procedure would have several benefits:
• The pharmaceutical company would de facto be allowed to keep its
profit (the new entity’s shareholders would turn down a tender price
below this profit).
• At the same time, monopoly prices would not prevail. That is, the
medicine would no longer be targeted to the elite of the country.
• Country differentiation would obtain. Richer countries would pay
more for control over the medicine.
This mechanism has costs as well. As mentioned above, doing this for all
medicines and countries would be infeasible. Grouping countries and/or
medicines would be required. On the other hand (and as for compulsory
licensing), the procedure could just be a default point on which negotiation
would most often converge (and so the procedure itself would rarely be
invoked). Another potential difficulty, as in any purchase funding proposal
(see below), is the availability of the money. We therefore have in mind that
such a scheme would apply primarily to poor countries. For rich countries,
the sums at stake might be too large to attract funding.
Little economic research has investigated the trade-offs, and certainly
much remains to be done in the area.
PURCHASE FUNDS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES
The previous discussion of a market-oriented scheme for the purchase of
licenses for global diseases brings us to the purchase fund proposal for ne-
glected diseases. I’ll be brief both because many of the difficulties faced by
these proposals are similar to those, discussed earlier, faced by compulsory
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licensing (both approaches involve an ex post purchase, using taxpayer
money in the case of aid, and user money under actual compulsory licensing
practice, in order to compensate the innovator), and because the benefits of
and obstacles faced by purchase funds policies have been discussed with
much lucidity by Michael Kremer (2001a, 2001b, 2002).
The prize system, in which the innovator receives a lump sum for deliv-
ering an invention with specified characteristics, and thereby forfeits any IPR,
has a long history but was not employed much through the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Lately, though, its principle has made a comeback with
proposals by the World Bank, the WHO, and the Clinton administration.
In theory, the prize mechanism is quite appealing since it allows an un-
limited diffusion of the knowledge created by the inventive act. In practice,
though, it is very difficult to define in advance the characteristics of an in-
novation, which raises the issue of the ex post assessment of its value. The
patent system, for all its flaws, has the major benefit that its market-based
reward approach is not subject to the two rocks that bureaucratic procedures
usually strike: capture and overpayment, and opportunistic expropriation
and underpayment.
Kremer offers the design for a prize mechanism for neglected diseases
based on, among other things:
• A list of specifications to be satisfied by the vaccine or drug (efficacy,
length of protection, side effects, sensitivity to improper usage, and
monitoring . . . )
• A technical approval process by an independent agency (which keeps
in mind that the medicine may be the only hope for poor countries)
• A market-based test that uses copayments by countries, which would
then supply yet another signal about the medicine’s efficacy.
Kremer also discusses the (complex) design of prizes in a world with se-
quential innovations.
It is clear that this approach is partly dependent on rich countries being
willing to contribute to the purchase funds. If experience with international
aid in general, and with health-related aid in particular,26 unfortunately does
not invite much optimism, economists and political scientists should none-
theless attempt to design multilateral processes that alleviate the free-rider
problem.
In the matter of neglected diseases, as for global diseases, economic re-
search that can help guide policy is scarce, and further research in this area
as well is most welcome.
NOTES
1. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (1994). The TRIPS
agreement has homogenized the (minimum standard for) protection of novel, non-
obvious, and useful inventions, including pharmaceuticals, to twenty years for all
members of the WTO. The protection of IPRs should naturally be defined broadly,
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not solely through the lens of formal laws but also considering the extent of their
enforcement (see, e.g., Combe and Pfister 2002, for survey evidence of corporate
perceptions of the relative importance of the legal IP framework and its enforcement).
2. Kettler and Collins (2002), 6.
3. This fear has been growing with the development of the Internet (Lanjouw
2001, pp. 6–7). Much of the parallel importation at this stage occurs between devel-
oped countries (e.g., Canada and the United States).
4. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2002), 31.
5. Kremer (2002), 80.
6. Phadke (1998).
7. For example, WHO’s Expanded Programme of Immunization, while a clear
success, still fails to reach many children despite the low cost of vaccines—less than
$1 for a polyvalent vaccine (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002, p. 35).
8. Lybecker (2003).
9. Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (2001), 12.
10. Moran, in Session 6 (2002).
11. Kremer (2001a, 2001b). Note that this argument differs from the standard
one (unrelated to the quality of the health infrastructure), according to which vaccines
are undersupplied in a market economy because people don’t internalize the reduced
risk of contagion for others when they choose whether to be inoculated. See Kremer
and Snyder (2003) for an interesting analysis of comparative biases in the provision
of vaccine and drug research.
12. The United States has such a tax deduction for donations, but it is rather
small because it is computed on the basis of the medicine’s production cost.
13. Kremer (2002), 86.
14. For the technically minded reader, these conditions are (1) economic agents
differ in their ability to earn money (say, their hourly wage); (2) their incomes (but
not their ability to earn money) are perfectly verifiable by tax authorities; (3) their
preferences are perfectly separable between their labor input, on the one side, and a
basket of consumption goods and services, on the other side (that is, their relative
preference for two goods is independent of the amount of their labor); and (4) there
are no consumption externalities.
15. How much more equal depends on both the government’s preference for
equality and the incentive effect of income taxation on the supply of production
factors such as labor.
16. Under the constraint linked to the fact that manufacturers can threaten not
to market the drug in the national market in question.
17. There are other motivations than emergencies for compulsory licensing in the
United States and other developed countries. First, competition authorities and courts
may order licensing because they deem that a piece of IP is a “unique path” that
cannot be bypassed by producers of follow-up innovations or of downstream prod-
ucts, and that the piece of IP allows its owner to command a rent incommensurate
with the investment cost. A special case of this situation may arise when a patented
technology becomes a standard, and thereby an “essential facility” for the industry.
Second, compulsory licenses are often requested when a merger reduces competition.
For instance, in the Ciba-Geigy-Sandoz 1997 merger into Novartis (which also con-
trolled Chiron), the U.S. Federal Trade Commission required the merged entity to
license a number of products to Rhoˆne Poulenc Rorer and to offer nonexclusive
licenses of Cytokine (at, at most, 3% of the net sale prices) to all requesters.
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Last, there are a number of exemptions to the free exercise of ownership of IP, as
when other inventors are entitled to a free use of patented IP for experimental pur-
poses.
18. The World Bank and other multilateral organizations increasingly resort to
NGOs in the delivery of services to poor countries, in an effort to bypass potentially
corrupt national and local governments. While this policy is to be applauded, one
should also recognize its limits, both in terms of the need to enlist the cooperation
of local officials for the provision of complementary services, and of the observation
that NGOs, as they secure bigger and bigger budgets and become (unelected) gov-
ernments, will attract more opportunistic (and less idealistic) types.
19. See Crampes and Hollander (2003) and Jack and Lanjouw (2003) for Ramsey
theoretic frameworks of pharmaceuticals’ pricing. Crampes and Hollander develop a
detailed analysis of the impact of parallel imports on the world price structure of
pharmaceuticals.
20. Roughly, price caps impose an average-price-level constraint. For the link be-
tween price caps and Ramsey pricing, see Laffont and Tirole (2000), chap. 2.
21. Under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS agreement, a licensee under a compulsory
license must produce primarily for the domestic market of the member granting the
license. (There are a number of other conditions, such as the necessity of prior ne-
gotiations with the patent owner and the subjection to independent review. See
Scherer and Watal 2001.) Article 31(h) of the TRIPS agreement. provides that “the
rights holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case,
taking into account the economic value of the authorization.” See Abbott (2002), 35,
for an interpretation of this article.
22. Brazil and India are the best-known producers of copies. For data on India,
see Lanjouw (1998), and on Brazil, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
(2002), 43. Other countries with competitive producers of copies include Argentina,
Chile, Italy, Turkey, South Korea, Egypt, and Lebanon. See Maskus (2000) for more
details.
23. From 1923 through 1992, Canada had an extensive compulsory license policy.
In the 1970s and 1980s, it mostly employed a royalty rate of 4% of the licensee’s
price.
24. The choice between these two policies probably would not affect the final
price much, especially for those medicines with low production costs; 4% on a com-
petitive price (competition among licensees bringing prices close to marginal cost)
would not have much impact on the diffusion. The benefit of a lump-sum payment
is that it allows for more differentiation between low-income countries (which pre-
sumably would pay a very low amount) and medium-income countries; on the other
hand, the royalties could be differentiated according to income, but with the drawback
that medicine prices would depart much more from marginal cost for middle-income
countries. Other relevant considerations are that proportional (price-based) payments
better reflect the “size of the market” for a particular pharmaceutical (for example,
how widespread the disease is in the country), but are too sensitive to the magnitude
of marginal production costs (which may differ widely across medicines).
25. The standard free-riding problem would not occur because it would be as if
the entity were taken private. The idea of a takeover was first proposed by Cohen
(2000), who suggests a takeover of the firm, followed by a spin-off of unwanted
entities.
26. For example, the U.S. National Institutes of Health spent only 0.8% of its
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1999 budget on tropical diseases (Lanjouw 2001, p. 23). Similar figures apply to Eu-
ropean countries.
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